Author note: The Chinese version of the following article has been submitted to Ming Pao before Hong Kong Airport’s three-runway operation commenced in late 2024. Ming Pao declined to published it, citing they have “too many op-eds”. The fact, as I know, is not. There is nothing seditious in this article, and everything is based on facts. The experience also shows how (over) cautious the media outlets in Hong Kong are, and the pressing need to overcome the fear and get the truth out to the world.
Thirteen years ago, various concern groups questioned whether the Airport Authority’s third runway plan could achieve a capacity of handling up to 102 flights per hour under the airspace constraints of the Pearl River Delta (PRD). Civil society groups repeatedly urged the past two administrations to think twice before proceeding, warning against excessive optimism that could render the third runway a wasted effort. Despite their persistent pleas, little heed was paid. Thirteen years later, judging from the flight paths outlined in the Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) for the three-runway system and the airport’s flight schedules, the public’s doubts about the third runway seem to be gradually turning into reality.
“102 Flights Per Hour” Still Lacks Supporting Airspace
A report submitted to the Airport Authority by its UK-based consultant, NATS, had long pointed out that without changes to the PRD airspace, the third runway would struggle to handle more than 75 flights per hour. It was precisely for this reason that former Transport and Housing Secretary Anthony Cheung Bing-leung signed an “airspace co-management” agreement with PRD airports under Beijing’s oversight, promising that once the three-runway system was operational, Hong Kong would secure the necessary airspace to handle up to 102 flights per hour. However, according to the Aeronautical Information Publication effective on the third runway’s opening day, changes to Hong Kong airport’s airspace layout remain limited. The “air wall” separating Hong Kong’s flight information region from the PRD persists, and the northbound and westbound flight paths—assumed by consultants to boost potential capacity—are nowhere to be found. Data from the Hong Kong Schedule Coordination Office website further reveals that in the first winter season after the three-runway system’s activation, the peak hourly flight handling capacity is only 72 flights. These figures confirm that without airspace coordination to expand flight paths, achieving the promised 102 flights per hour remains elusive.
Technology Alone Cannot Meet Long-Term Goals
Civil Aviation Department officials once told Ming Pao that the Airport Authority’s consultants claimed new navigation technology (Required Navigation Performance, or RNP) would enable the three runways to reach the 102-flight-per-hour target. This assertion, however, seems at odds with civil aviation planning principles. According to the International Civil Aviation Organization’s standards for multi-runway flight path planning, if Hong Kong airport’s three westbound runways (25L, 25C, and 25R) were to simultaneously accommodate takeoffs and landings (e.g., south runway 25L for both takeoff and landing, center runway 25C for takeoff, and north runway 25R for landing), aircraft on the center runway would inevitably need to enter airspace currently managed by mainland China. While RNP approach procedures could allow westbound aircraft to land in parallel on the south and north runways, this scenario—without encroaching into Chinese airspace—would still require the center runway aircraft to wait until both landings are complete before taking off. The time saved would be minimal, let alone sufficient to increase flight frequency. Even the newly introduced eastbound RNP Y approach procedure, which loops over Lung Kwu Tan back to the airport island, only permits landings on the south runway, not the north, and fails to leverage parallel approaches to boost capacity.
South Korea’s Incheon Airport serves as a case in point: despite offering RNP approach technology across its four runways, its proximity to North Korean airspace prevents optimal runway planning. As a result, its four runways can handle a maximum of just 104 flights per hour. Incheon’s example underscores that airspace scope and capacity—not technology—are the decisive factors in determining whether runway capacity targets can be met. This is precisely why the Hong Kong SAR government initially proposed “airspace co-management” with the PRD to secure the third runway’s capacity. Yet, as long as no timeline for fulfilling this promise is announced, it amounts to an indefinite delay in the eyes of the public.
Becoming a Pipe Dream
According to the third runway’s Environmental Impact Assessment, the three-runway system is expected to reach its design capacity by 2032, handling over 607,000 aircraft movements annually. The project is funded by every passenger using the airport, while the public treasury sees a reduced share of airport profits as a result. The current administration has a clear opportunity to correct the missteps of its predecessors by releasing Hong Kong’s proposed flight path map from the PRD coordination group, along with a timeline and roadmap for achieving the 102-flight-per-hour target. Only then can it restore public trust. If the three runways fail to secure the airspace they need in the future, the numbers promised and the vision sold to the public may well turn out to be nothing more than a pipe dream, and someone should be accountable for it.
